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I. INTRODUCTION
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission might be viewed as a dispute about the control over
redistricting, with a heavy emphasis on the perceived problems of
and solutions to partisan gerrymandering and incumbent entrenchment.1 Or the case might be about the power of the people to wrest
control from an unresponsive legislature and pass their own laws via
ballot initiative.2 But that is not really this case. This Article notes
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I received
valuable support for this Article from my colleagues here in Malibu. I offer my sincere
thanks to Michael Helfand, Michael Morley, Dan Tokaji, Franita Tolson, and participants
at the Florida State University Law Review symposium for their helpful comments. Special
thanks to Derek O’Reilly-Jones for his excellent legal research.
1. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2658 (2015) (“This case concerns an endeavor by Arizona voters to address the
problem of partisan gerrymandering . . . .”).
2. Id. at 2675 (“In this light, it would be perverse to interpret the term ‘Legislature’
in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the people . . . .”); cf. Derek T.
Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237 (2012)
(describing the breadth of state control over presidential elections).
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that it is something more nuanced. This case is less about the ballot
initiative or about partisan gerrymandering, and more about a
delegation of legislative power from the legislature to an unelected
agency.
The case turned almost exclusively on the definition of the word
“Legislature” as it appears in the Constitution, which has little precedent in Supreme Court opinions except for a couple of century-old
cases of tangential relevance.3 But there is also a rich history of interpreting and constructing the Elections Clause—but it has occurred
in Congress and in the states. These historical election disputes were
all but absent in the Supreme Court, effectively ignored.
This Article examines the dispute over Arizona’s independent
redistricting commission largely through a critique of the delegation
of power from the legislature to an unelected entity. It then examines
the historical records from two sources. First, it scrutinizes preSeventeenth Amendment discussions about the power to delegate
legislative power to the people. Second, it considers congressional
adjudications about election disputes concerning the proper role of
the state legislature and delegations of the lawmaking power to other
entities. These two examinations conclude that the historical understanding of the power of the “Legislature” precluded a delegation of
its power to another entity. It concludes with some concerns about
several Justices’ conclusions in the case, along with parting thoughts
about the impact of these historical records in future litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
Arizonans enacted Proposition 106 in 2000, which transferred the
power to draw legislative districts from the Arizona legislature to an
independent redistricting commission.4 The Arizona legislature sued,
challenging the commission’s power to redraw congressional districts.
That is because it cited Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the United
States Constitution, often known as the “Elections Clause.” It provides “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic]
Senators.”5
The Arizona state legislature argued that the ballot initiative
transferred power from the legislature to the commission.6 Because
3. See cases cited infra note 13.
4. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
6. Brief for Appellant at 12-14, 23-53, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314).
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the legislature must retain at least some power to draw congressional
districts, it claimed that transference was unconstitutional. And because the independent redistricting commission is not the “Legislature,” the law should fall.
An additional point about what was at issue in this case requires
clarification. The issue was not specifically whether a ballot initiative
could create a redistricting commission. Indeed, at oral argument,
Paul Clement, representing the legislature, noted that the issue
would be the same whether the transfer of power happened by an
executive fiat.7 Instead, the problem was that the newly created
commission permanently and totally divested the legislature of any
power to draw districts.8 Mr. Clement further suggested that a permanent delegation of authority to this commission, even if sanctioned
by the state legislature, might also be problematic.9 That total divestment is the problem—not necessarily the means by which the
divestment took place.
The Arizona Constitution assigns the independent redistricting
commission its responsibilities in the “legislative responsibilities”
section.10 There, it characterizes the commission as exercising “legislative power” when considering a challenge to the removal of a member of the commission.11 Thus, vesting the redistricting commission in
an independent commission delegates the legislature’s power.
The briefs in the case focused on founding-era dictionaries12 and a
couple of early twentieth century Supreme Court cases.13 But many
7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314).
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 14.
10. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 39 (first citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); then citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792)); Brief for Appellees Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, et al. at 39-40, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2652 (No. 131314) (first citing JOHNSON, supra; then citing NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 174 (1806) [hereinafter WEBSTER, COMPENDIOUS
DICTIONARY]); Brief of the Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 5, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2652 (No. 13-1314)
(citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1755) [hereinafter JOHNSON, DICTIONARY 1st ed.]; then citing NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL
ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (14th ed. 1751); and then citing THOMAS DYCHE &
WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (12th ed. 1760)); Brief of Former
Cal. Governors George Deukmejian, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4, 8,
Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2652 (No. 13-1314) (citing JOHNSON, DICTIONARY 1st
ed., supra; then citing THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1797); and then citing NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY (20th ed. 1763); and finally citing WEBSTER, COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY,
supra).
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other sources of authority have grappled extensively with this definition of the word “Legislature”—evidenced by the litigation and debates surrounding pre-Seventeenth Amendment reforms regarding
the election of senators and in the quasi-judicial findings of Congress
itself in disputes arising under the Elections Clause.
III. LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS CONCERNING
THE ELECTION OF SENATORS
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution provides, “The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator
shall have one vote.”14 Section 4 continues, “The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except
as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”15 The phrase “by the Legislature thereof” appears in consecutive sections of the Constitution.
The difference is in the verbs “chosen” and “prescribed.”16
Admittedly, an analogy comparing the two rests on an assumption
that the “Legislature” for purposes of section 3 is the same as the
“Legislature” for purposes of section 4. The Court has not always
treated them the same,17 and neither has Congress.18 But some analysis about the meaning of the word “Legislature” in section 3 prior to
the Seventeenth Amendment still might prove instructive.
At the founding, the Constitution originally dictated that the “Legislature [of the State]” was responsible for electing that state’s senators.19 A compromise at the constitutional convention ensured that
13. Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 9, 13 (citing Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,
241 U.S. 565 (1916); then citing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932)); Brief for Appellees,
supra note 12, at 40-41 (citing Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365-66; then citing Hildebrant, 241 U.S.
at 569-70; and then citing Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229-31 (1920)).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. (amended 1913).
15. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
16. Id.
17. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365-66 (explaining that the term ‘legislature’ has always
referred to the same thing, the legislative body that makes the laws of the people, and
noting that the use of the term in different relations throughout the federal Constitution
only implies that that same body will perform different functions in different situations);
see also Ariz. State Legislature, 135 U.S. at 2667-68 (explaining state legislatures
performed different functions, dependent on the duties required by the different sections of
the Constitution).
18. Cf. Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature
Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 769 & n.249 (2001) (noting that in 1903, the Senate as
a whole firmly rejected a senate report by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that
implied that the two uses of “legislature” should be interpreted identically).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. (amended 1913); see also Focus on the Constitution:
Constitutional Crisis of the Civil War Senate, U.S. SENATE, http://senate.gov/artandhistory/
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one of the houses of Congress would be held accountable directly to
the people, and the other house would be more directly responsive to
the state legislature.20 By the early twentieth century, this measure
of election had fallen out of favor with progressives: increased deadlock, spoiled selections, and vacancies led to disapproval.21 They favored direct election of senators. State legislatures themselves disapproved of the responsibility the Constitution placed upon them—they
were very close to calling a constitutional convention22 before Congress ratified the Seventeenth Amendment and sent it to the states.23
But why was the Seventeenth Amendment required? If state legislatures wanted to give their power to the people, could they have
done so directly? Contemporaneous legal consensus agreed unanimously that state legislatures could not so delegate their power to
another entity.24
A. Preference Primaries and Ballot Notations
Oregon first attempted a unilateral effort to provide for the direct
election of senators. It held a preferential primary in which the people could vote for their preferred senate candidate.25 But the primary
did not bind the legislature: plurality winners of this election had no

history/common/briefing/direct_election_senators.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (noting
that the onset of the Civil War saw pro-union factions of seceding states electing their own
senators).
20. James Madison, Thursday June 7th, 1787, in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 150, 152-56 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (recording the ten to one
dismissal of James Wilson’s proposal to consider referring election of senators to the people
followed by the ten to zero approval of John Dickenson’s motion to appoint election of the
Senate to state legislatures); James Madison, Monday June 25, in THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 405-08 (recording the nine to two dismissal of the
same proposition when Wilson brought it up again in a different context).
21. Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of
the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 538-46 (1997) (claiming the three
major motivations for the Seventeenth Amendment to be popular concern over corruption
in state legislatures, deadlock and delay in the election of senators, and an argument by
members of the populist movement that the people could be and should be entrusted with
direct election).
22. Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the
Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 710 (1999)
(stating that twenty-seven of the thirty-one states needed had formally called for a
convention, with Arizona and New Mexico expected to do so as soon as their statehoods
became official, and with Alabama and Wyoming having submitted resolutions but not yet
formally called for a convention).
23. H.R.J. Res. 39, 62d Cong. (1912).
24. See infra Sections IV.A-B.
25. ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 76
(1978).
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right to the Senate, and their fate still hinged on the state legislature’s vote.26 Popular primary winners could lose, and did lose, the
actual election when the state legislature met.27
Nevertheless, the Oregon system became a model for many states
after its introduction.28 Similar efforts were underway in other
states, and some of these efforts were met with legal challenges.
Often, legal scrutiny examined whether the preference primary operated as a delegation of power from the legislature to the people. The
North Dakota Supreme Court, for example, when examining the
state’s statutes that mirrored Oregon’s, concluded, “The Legislature
still elects the senator, and the act merely gives the voters of each
party an opportunity to express their choice of candidates, as we have
heretofore observed.”29 The fact that the authority to elect senators
still resided with the “legislature” mattered.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also considered the scope of a preference primary. With rhetorical flourish, it emphasized that “the duty of the legislators to meet, consult, and exercise their conscientious
judgments” remained with the legislature, but that the primary indicated, “the wishes of the people are entitled to grave consideration.”30
But, as with North Dakota, a primary merely influenced the legislature, something like a petition to the legislature. The ultimate power
resided in the Wisconsin legislature, which saved the law.
[I]f it be the object and purpose of this law to shift the burden of,
and responsibility for, the election of United States Senators from
the Legislature to the electorate; if our legislators are to play the
part of automatons and become mere passive instruments by and
through whom the will of the voters is to be carried out; if to them
is left the perfunctory duty of ratifying the action of the voters
at the primaries, as the members of our electoral college confirm
the result of a presidential election; if the electors in reality elect
United States Senators, instead of the Legislature—then the constitutional scheme has been superseded, and the spirit of the Constitution has been evaded and disregarded.31

26. C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 146 (1995) (“But there was still the irritating possibility that a
candidate who had garnered a bare plurality of primary votes in one party would win the
Senate seat over a much more popular candidate whose party was not in the legislative
majority.”).
27. ALLEN H. EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM: THE STORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN
OREGON 94 (1912).
28. GRIMES, supra note 25, at 76.
29. State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 118 N.W. 141, 147 (N.D. 1908); see also id. (“[I]t is
not a delegation of legislative power, as the Legislature, in electing a United States
Senator, does not act in a legislative way at all.”).
30. State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 125 N.W. 961, 971 (Wis. 1910).
31. Id.
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An additional initiative sought to strengthen the impact of the
Oregon system by giving incentives to legislatures to support the
people’s choice.
Candidates for the legislature were then “permitted” to include
in their platform one of two statements regarding their views on
the election of senators. ‘Statement #1’ assured the voters that
a candidate would, regardless of party affiliation, abide by the
results of the general election. ‘Statement #2’ declared the
candidate’s intention to vote according to his personal discretion,
and no doubt to his own political peril.32

A similar law was also implemented in Nebraska.33
There might be problems with a ballot notation that dictates
whether a candidate for office pledges to adhere to some other condition for office—indeed, the Supreme Court expressly struck down
similar notations in Cook v. Gralike, even as Nebraska relied on its
history of senate pledge notations.34 The goal, of course, was to put
weighty political pressure on the legislature. Nevertheless, neither
the original Oregon system, nor the addition of a ballot notation,
seized away from the legislature the role in electing senators. Instead, both sought to influence the state legislature in the exercise of
its function without wholly usurping it.
B. Pledges
The Oregon system took another step beyond primaries and notations. By 1908, a new law would require members of the legislature to
take an oath pledging to vote for the senate candidate who received
the most votes in the preference primary, making a pledge supporting “Statement #1” compulsory.35 Commentary at the time concluded,
“Doubtless this measure was unconstitutional . . . .”36 Its constitutionality in Oregon was never challenged; but similar efforts in other
states are instructive.
A challenge to Wisconsin’s primary concluded that no pledge was
required in its laws, which avoided any potential problems: “Not a
word is said in the act about requiring legislative candidates to
pledge themselves to support the nominee of the party. The law in
32. HOEBEKE, supra note 26, at 146.
33. Rossum, supra note 22, at 710.
34. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522-27 (2001); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae State
of Neb. in Support of Petitioner at 17-20, Cook, 531 U.S. at 510 (No. 99-929).
35. EATON, supra note 27, at 169 n.22 (“I further state to the people of Oregon as well
as to the people of my delegation district that during my term of office I will always vote for
that candidate for United States Senator in Congress who has received the highest number
of the people’s votes for that position at the general election next preceding the election of
the Senator in Congress without regard of my individual preference.”).
36. Id. at 96.
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terms imposes no duty upon any member of the Legislature to
vote for any person who was a candidate before the primary.”37 In
North Dakota, a similar pledge was struck down as an additional
qualification for state legislative office. Once the pledge was negated,
the primary system could remain in place, because “[t]he legislative
member is in no manner obligated or required, except perhaps morally” to vote for any candidate.38
Finally, even though no litigation challenged the compulsory Oregon pledge, it remained unenforceable. Consider the Oregon legislature’s senate election in early 1913, well after the full force of the
Oregon system was in place and shortly before the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment. Despite a compulsory pledge purportedly
binding all legislators, some legislators still voted for a senate candidate who did not receive the plurality of the preference primary’s
votes.39 Contemporary scholarly commentary generally accepted that
any such system could not result in the legislature wholly abdicating
its role in electing senators.40 Indeed, one concern addressed the “delegation” of legislative power “to some commission.”41 The legislature
would continue to exercise its own judgment and final authority in
senate elections until the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.

37. State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 125 N.W. 961, 971 (Wis. 1910).
38. State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 118 N.W. 141, 145 (N.D. 1908); see also id.
(assessing the “assumption that the pledge feature of the law, when considered in
connection with the provisions permitting the members of each political party to designate
their choice as to senatorial candidates, in effect operates as an election of United States
Senators by popular vote, instead of by the Legislature, as the federal Constitution
requires. If, therefore, the pledge feature of the statute is eliminated because
unconstitutional [sic], much of counsel’s argument ceases to have any force.”); accord Frear,
125 N.W. at 971 (“This provision was held to be unconstitutional and void, because it was
an attempt to coerce the member of the Legislature to abdicate their right to use their
individual judgments in making a selection, but it was also held that such [a] void
provision did not affect the remainder of the act.”); id. at 972 (“[T]he act creates neither a
legal duty nor moral obligation to carry out the verdict at the primary . . . .”) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
39. See JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH LEGIS. ASSEMB. OF THE
STATE OF OR., Reg. Sess., at 117 (1913) (noting that Harry Lane won the plurality of votes
in the preference primary and recording a vote in the Oregon Senate of twenty-eight votes
for Mr. Lane and two votes for Ben Selling); id. at 131 (noting the preference primary
results and recording a vote in the Oregon House of fifty-nine votes for Mr. Lane and one
vote for Mr. Selling).
40. Note, Devices for Securing in Substance Direct Election of United States Senators.,
24 HARV. L. REV. 50, 50-51 (1910); cf. Samuel Russell, The Constitutional Power of State
Legislatures to Direct Election of Senators by the Popular Electorate, 16 VA. L. REG. 818,
820 (1911) (explaining that amending Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution to include “in
such manner as the legislature thereof may direct,” consistent with the Presidential
Electors Clause, would ensure state discretion in the manner of appointment).
41. Russell, supra note 40, at 820 (comparing the legislature submitting senators’
election to a popular vote with an agent submitting a doubtful point to his principal for
decision, the precise opposite of delegation).
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This trail through the Oregon system suggests that while legislatures increasingly obtained direct guidance from their constituents
regarding senate elections, they were never fully “deprived” of their
ultimate role in electing senators.42 They always held the ultimate
authority and final say in the process—despite other forces
that would increasingly persuade or influence their election process.
Notable, too, is the emphasis on the power of the legislature and not
on the form of the possible delegation—judicial critiques focused
much more on the fact that the legislature may have lost power than
the fact that the transfer of power happened by initiative.43 It also
explains why the Seventeenth Amendment was needed to amend the
Constitution: neither a popular initiative nor a legislative act could
delegate its electoral authority to some other tribunal. The text of the
Constitution precluded such a delegation, and amendment was
necessary.
IV. LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS
CONCERNING THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
The Constitution also provides that each house of Congress “shall
be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members.”44 Courts have established myriad ways of adjudicating
congressional elections disputes.45 But Congress itself also engages in
a judicial function when it evaluates who has won an election, and
whether that winner is qualified to take a congressional seat.46 I have

42. Cf. Vikram David Amar, Reflections on the Oral Argument in the Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission Case, JUSTIA.COM (Mar. 13, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/
2015/03/13/reflections-oral-argument-arizona-independent-redistricting-commission-case
(suggesting that as states adopted plans similar to Oregon’s, legislatures were effectively
removed from the process of electing senators).
43. See Russell, supra note 40, at 821 (“It is for the United States Senate to construe
these provisions of the Constitution, and they would be construed with a view to place no
unnecessary restrictions on the right of each state to its equal suffrage in the senate. The
Constitution does not forbid the election of United States Senators by the people, but
rather commits the matter to legislative discretion.”); see also DANIEL A.
SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
45. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J.
1, 24-29 (2013).
46. See Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929)
(“Generally, the Senate is a legislative body, exercising in connection with the House only
the power to make laws. But it has had conferred upon it by the Constitution certain
powers, which are not legislative, but judicial, in character. Among these is the power to
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.”). See generally
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (discussing extensively the scope and limits of
Congress’s power to adjudicate upon its own members’ qualifications).
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written extensively about Congress’s role in this regard when it
comes to qualifications.47 But what about elections? Specifically, has
Congress ever interpreted what the Elections Clause means?
As an important qualification to the enumerations below, these
cases are complicated. They are at times internally inconsistent.
They often include findings that are not essential to the decision to
seat or deny to seat a member. Sometimes they include findings that
are not ultimately adopted by a house of Congress. And the descriptions below are great simplifications, which may lack some of the nuance that the totality of the congressional record might reflect.
A. The Independent State Legislature Doctrine
Congress’s power to adjudicate election disputes has been significant—and not just to interpret the winners and losers, but to scrutinize conformity with statutory and constitutional law.48 In some of
those cases, Congress and state courts have interpreted the Elections
Clause through the lens of the “independent state legislature doctrine”—the notion that the state legislature’s power pursuant to the
Clause arises from the United States Constitution and not from any
state law.49 Four congressional adjudications typify examination of
this doctrine.
1. The Case of Farlee Against Runk
In 1846, Mr. Runk won an election by just 16 votes, but Mr. Farlee
argued that it was only because thirty-six students at Princeton illegally voted for Mr. Runk. Of the nineteen depositions, of those not
entitled to vote, four had voted for Runk, one for Farlee, and the remaining fourteen declined to testify. An 1844 law promulgated by the
legislature forbid college students from voting in New Jersey, but a
subsequent constitutional amendment permitted students to vote if
they were residents of the state for one year and of the county for five
months. If the Princeton students were eligible, or if they were not
determinative of the outcome, then Mr. Runk would win; if the prior
law trumped the later constitutional amendment, and if the illegal
voters were not determinative of the outcome, then Mr. Farlee would

47. Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559,
581 (2015).
48. See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Congressional Authority to Protect Voting Rights After
Shelby County and Arizona Inter Tribal, 13 ELECTION L.J. 322, 328-34 (2014).
49. Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections
Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 131, 150 (2015) (noting that the House of
Representatives interpreted the Elections Clause in 1866 to resolve an election challenge
and that the Senate interpreted the Elections Clause in an 1874 report written by its
Committee on Privileges and Elections); Smith, supra note 18, at 4.

2016]

LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS

727

win. By a split vote, 96-96, Mr. Runk retained his seat.50 In 1846, a
state constitutional amendment supplanted the state legislature’s
prior law—or, the evidence was inconclusive to establish that enough
invalid votes existed under the state legislature’s law.
2. The Case of Shiel Against Thayer
Oregon in 1861, George K. Shiel was elected on the day fixed by
the state’s constitution. A.J. Thayer, however, had been later elected
on the day of the presidential election. There was no law dictating
that the congressional election was to be held on the day of the presidential election.51 But a committee report noted that the state constitution “has fixed, beyond the control of the legislature, the time for
holding an election for Representative.”52 Mr. Shiel was seated pursuant to the state constitution in the absence of a directive from the
state legislature.
3. The Case of Baldwin Against Trowbridge
In 1864, the Michigan constitution required voters to be residents
of the state three months prior to Election Day. To enfranchise soldiers, the Legislature enacted a law authorizing voting even if one
had not been a resident for that period. Mr. Trowbridge was permitted to retain his seat, even though he had been elected with the support of soldiers who voted pursuant to the state law rather than the
constitutional requirement.53
4. The Case of Donnelly Against Washburn
In 1880, Ignatius Donnelly challenged a seat held by William D.
Washburn of Minnesota. One basis for the challenge was the fact
that the state legislature required that St. Paul and Minneapolis
number their ballots for elections as a mechanism to prevent fraud,
and Mr. Washburn was elected under that system. The state courts
later found the law unconstitutional because it violated the privilege
of secrecy in voting.54 But in Mr. Washburn’s defense, members of the
committee noted that the state constitution held no power over the
legislature in this instance, because “this right and power is derived

50. ASHER C. HINDS, 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
UNITED STATES § 813, at 1054-56 (1907); see also CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess.
2319 (1858).
51. HINDS, supra note 50, § 613, at 797.
52. Id. § 522, at 654.
53. ASHER C. HINDS, 2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNITED STATES § 856, at 24-27 (1907).
54. Id. § 947, at 238.
THE
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exclusively from the Constitution of the United States.”55 Ultimately,
the committee could not reach a conclusion on the matter, and Mr.
Washburn retained his seat, effectively elected pursuant to the state
legislature’s statute and not the state constitutional provision.
In Arizona State Legislature, the Court only addressed two of
these cases, Shiel and Baldwin, and Justices gave the cases differing
weight. The majority cited the dicta in Shiel for the proposition that
the Constitution could control a state law—dicta, because there was
no state law to the contrary.56 Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent cited
Baldwin for the proposition that a state law could trump the
Constitution.57
B. Additional Views of the Power of the State
Legislature Under the Elections Clause
The “independent state legislature doctrine,” however, is not the
only basis for congressional exploration of the scope of the legislature’s power under the Elections Clause. A reading of Congress’s adjudication of disputes arising under the Elections Clause leads to a
few potential conclusions.
1. Executive Power to Fill Vacancies: The Case of John Hoge
In 1804, the House evaluated whether to seat John Hoge of Pennsylvania. A congressman resigned, and the governor issued a writ of
election. Hoge won that election. Some members of the House argued
that the election was not valid because the rules for the election had
not been prescribed by the “Legislature,” but by the executive. Nevertheless, the House seated him, because pursuant to Article I, Section
2, Clause 4, the “Executive Authority” of a state “shall issue Writs
of Election to fill” vacancies, and, absent a rule from the Legislature
articulating the time, place, and manner of such elections, the executive has the power to articulate such rules.58 The executive could act
in the absence of the state legislature on account of independent
authorization under the Constitution.

55. Id. § 947, at 240.
56. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673
(2015).
57. Id. at 2685-86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
58. See generally 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 837-58 (1804); id. at 841-44 (showing the
explanation of Mr. Findley, chairman of the Committee on Elections, and his finding that
“[t]he Governor had acted in obedience to the express words of the Constitution, and
violated no law of the State”).
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2. Constitutional Conventions
a. The Cases of Edouard Gilbert and George W. Wright
A California convention promulgated the state constitution, then
placed it before the people to ratify it. At the same election, the
people elected two representatives to the House, pursuant to the
soon-to-be-ratified Constitution. The elections of these two were challenged in 1850—after all, there was no Legislature of California,
much less a constitution, and there may have been an invalid election
as a result. But the House looked at its historic practice regarding
newly admitted states. Most states had sent representatives without
a law passed by the legislature designating the time, place, and
manner of elections.59 And while in most cases the constitution of the
state had been adopted prior to the election (even though the election
took place without an act of the legislature), in at least one other
state did the two events occur simultaneously.60 The House ultimately seated the two representatives pursuant to the state constitution
in the absence of a legislative directive.61
b. The Case of the West Virginia Members of the Forty-Third
Congress
West Virginia held a constitutional convention in early 1872. It
authorized a ratification vote, and elections for members of the legislature, on the fourth Thursday of August. But an 1869 law enacted
by the legislature required congressional elections to take place on
the fourth Thursday of October. Congressional elections were held on
both dates, and the dueling slates were presented to Congress. The
House ultimately concluded that the convention did have the power
to prescribe the time for elections, citing precedent in Michigan and
Iowa. And the House concluded that the election could take place
on the very day that the rules purporting to establish the time for
59. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1790 (1850) (“Now, I have examined all the
precedents that I have been able to find since this question arose, and so far as that
examination has extended, I find that every one of the new States, except Missouri and
Texas, sent Representatives here, and they were admitted to seats on this floor, without
any law having been previously passed by the Legislature of such State designating the
time, place, and manner of holding the elections.”); id. (“This Government has been going
on for half a century, admitting new States upon the very same principle, so far as the
admission of Representatives on this floor is concerned, upon which these Representatives
from California claim to be admitted . . . .”).
60. Id. (“But there is another objection taken to this, and it is, that in most of these
cases the constitution had been adopted before the members of Congress were elected.
Granted. But here is a case before us to meet that objection. Here is the constitution of
Michigan . . . . And was the admission of the members thus elected objected to? Not at all.
But there was, I suppose, at that time, in this body, no astute constitutional lawyer
distinguished as the gentleman from North Carolina, to raise such an objection.”).
61. Id. at 1779, 1795.
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elections were ratified by the people.62 It ultimately upheld the election held pursuant to the convention in the absence of a law from the
state legislature.63
c. The Cases of James B. Belford and Thomas M. Patterson
A similar episode took place in Colorado in 1876. Despite the
strong protests to the contrary, such as claims that “th[e] grant to
the convention is void because [it is] forbidden by the Constitution,”64
and “[t]he Constitution gave Congress the right to do it itself, not to
authorize some other tribunal,” the members of the House concluded
that the elections pursuant to rules promulgated by the convention
were proper.65
3. Delegations
a. The Case of John P. Stockton
The New Jersey Legislature had enacted a law authorizing a joint
session of the legislature to elect senators to Congress.66 The joint
meeting adopted its own rules, including rules dictating that the
recipient of a majority of the votes would be elected as senator.67 On
March 15, 1865, the joint meeting adopted a rule by a vote of fortyone to forty that the plurality winner would win the election.68 John
P. Stockton then received forty votes and was elected by plurality
vote.69
A dispute arose over whether this mode of election was valid. The
New Jersey Legislature had enacted a law indicating that senators
“shall be appointed by the Senate and General Assembly of this State
in joint meeting assembled.”70 Congress apparently agreed that the
legislature could elect a senator pursuant to Article I, Section 3 while
sitting in a joint session.71 Members of the Senate, however, disputed
whether the joint meeting could promulgate a rule authorizing election by plurality vote. “Appointed,” it was argued, was a term of
art in New Jersey that included a vote by a majority; or, absent a
62. See generally HINDS, supra note 50, § 522, at 649-60, for exhaustive details.
63. See id. at 660 (finding that two candidates were “duly elected” by virtue of the
August election).
64. 6 CONG. REC. 154 (1877).
65. See generally HINDS, supra note 50, §§ 523-524, at 660-67, for exhaustive details.
66. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1565-66 (1866).
67. Id. at 1564.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1565.
71. Id.
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directive from the legislature, a majority vote was necessary.72 While
the joint session may have had the authority to promulgate its own
rules, it did not have the authority to alter preexisting rules—“it
cannot undertake to change the parliamentary law or the common
law, because that is a matter that only the Legislature can do.”73
Further debate arose over how the state defines its own “legislature.” Mr. Stockton himself pointed out that the New Jersey Constitution “declares it a Legislature when sitting separately” and “declares it to be a Legislature when in joint meeting assembled.”74 It
became a philosophical point as to whether the “legislature” might
also include the two houses in joint meeting.75
But in the end, the validity of the election turned on only one of
two conclusions: that the joint convention was simply the legislature
arranged in a different form; or, that the joint convention’s parliamentary rule was not a “manner” “prescribed” pursuant to the Elections Clause.
As to the matter of form, it seemed straightforward to conclude
the legislature meeting in joint convention acted in the capacity
of the legislature, “for they could not give the authority to anybody
else.”76 But form was not the sole issue; function mattered as well.
The legislature for “choosing” was very different than the legislature
for “prescribing,” and while the legislature in joint assembly might
well elect, it could only do so because this configuration did not
impair the “choosing” function.77 For example, it did not prevent the
legislature from electing “without the participation of the Governor.”78 Accordingly, a joint convention could elect a senator because
the legislature had merely arranged itself into a different form and
not delegated its authority to another body.79

72. Id. (“And the word appointed is one used in the ancient constitution of New
Jersey . . . . Under the old constitution it meant election by a majority of all votes. We
submit that such is its meaning now.”); id. at 1566 (statement of Mr. Clark) (“[T]he
Legislature of New Jersey being silent on that subject, no competent authority having
prescribed the rule, it was necessary that there should be a majority of the votes of that
joint convention to entitle the Senator from New Jersey to hold his seat . . . .”).
73. Id. at 1568 (statement of Mr. Fessenden).
74. Id. (statement of Mr. Stockton).
75. Id. at 1568-69; see also id. at 1571 (statement of Mr. Johnson) (“[T]here is nothing
in the Constitution of the United States which prescribes to the States the manner in
which they shall elect their Legislature, or the powers which they shall devolve upon the
Legislatures so chosen.”).
76. Id. at 1571 (statement of Mr. Johnson).
77. Id. at 1590.
78. Id.; see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 703 (1991).
79. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1599 (1866).
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But exercising the lawmaking function was slightly different. “The
Legislature referred to in the Constitution is that tribunal in which is
vested the law-making power.”80 The joint convention lacked the same
power as the legislature, because it could not enact its own laws.
[I]f there had been a law upon the statute-book requiring a majority this convention could not have elected by a plurality, then I say
that that convention could not make such a rule. If it could not
repeal a law of the State, how has it this whole subject under its
control and the right to say by what number of votes a man shall
be appointed Senator? If they could say that he could be appointed
by a plurality they might just as well say that he might be selected
by lot, or by a committee appointed who should designate a name
and that individual be declared elected.81

Because the legislature had not enacted a law authorizing election by
plurality vote, the joint convention could not do so itself.82
A fallback claim argued the joint convention was not prescribing
the manner of election in a lawmaking capacity.83 If election by plurality vote were a kind of parliamentary rule that fell outside of the
typical formal lawmaking function, then the joint convention could
promulgate it without usurping the function of the legislature.84
Neither argument carried the day. And, with ambiguity, the Senate omitted the actual reasoning for determining that Stockton was
not entitled to his seat from their exclusion resolution.85
b. The Case of Sessinghaus v. Frost
Missouri had no statewide voter registration law in place in 1880
but had one in place for certain cities. St. Louis did not qualify as one

80. Id. at 1590.
81. Id. at 1595 (statement of Mr. Cragin); see also id. at 1601 (statement of Mr.
Sumner) (“This power is to be exercised by the ‘Legislature,’ which may prescribe the
manner. It is not to be exercised by any other body than the Legislature, and the manner is
to be prescribed by the Legislature. Now, assuming that it may be exercised in joint
meeting, it is clear that this must be in pursuance to some legislative act, which shall
prescribe in advance the manner.”); id. at 1668 (arguing that the joint convention could not
exercise legislative power).
82. See, e.g., id. at 1677 (statement of Mr. Sherman) (“[W]hile the Legislature may
prescribe a plurality rule in the election of a Senator, a joint convention of the Legislature
in the exercise of the law cannot do it.”).
83. Id. at 1673 (statement of Mr. Stockton) (“Although the Legislature in joint
meeting assembled may not be able to pass a law, or do any act which the Houses are
required to do separately, when it is admitted that they can elect a Senator, it necessarily
follows that they can pass rules for their governance while in the performance of that
duty.”).
84. Cf. id. at 1594 (statements of Mr. Clark and Mr. Stockton).
85. Id. at 1677.
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of those cities, but it enacted its own voter registration law anyway.
As a result, a number of otherwise-eligible voters were refused the
right to vote.
The majority of the committee considering the question concluded
that the St. Louis ordinance could not control the election.86 And
more detailed commentary questioned whether the state legislature
could even cede power to the city if it wanted to do so: “The Constitution of the United States having expressly declared that the manner
of holding elections for Representatives shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof, could the State Legislature or the
constitution of Missouri delegate its authority to any other power, to
any other body?”87 The answer was no:
I think there is no man . . . who will go to the length of saying that
any city, by virtue of any State constitution or any legislative enactment can adopt a system of registration imposing upon voters
regulations other than those imposed upon them by the constitution of their State or by the Legislature thereof.88

V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
To derive conclusions from these precedents is a challenge. But
some tendencies are apparent. The House has concluded that the
power to “prescribe” the “times, places, and manner” of elections may
be affected by other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Article
I, Section 2 power of the executive to issue writs of election when
vacancies happen. The Senate has found some relationship, but not
perfect symmetry, in the word “Legislature” in Article I, Section 3
and Section 4. There has been some, but not complete, preference for
the independent state legislature doctrine to allow the legislature to
act unencumbered by state constitutional law. The House has found
some flexibility responding to direct democracy in the context of
constitutional conventions; and there has been skepticism of the
delegation of legislative authority to another government entity.
These tendencies can clarify some understatements in the Court’s
factual explanations in the Arizona redistricting opinions.
A. Direct Democracy
By the mid-nineteenth century, Congress had repeatedly confronted issues concerning constitutional conventions, scrutinizing
whether the people could act in a lawmaking capacity. And houses of
86. HINDS, supra note 53, § 975, at 313-14.
87. 14 CONG. REC. 3617 (1883) (statement of Mr. Miller).
88. Id.; accord HINDS, supra note 53, § 975, at 314 (statement of Mr. A.A. Ranney) (“It
is more than doubtful whether the legislature, which is alone invested with authority of
this kind, could thus delegate it any way.”).
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Congress generally permitted the people to exercise that authority,
perhaps to the Chief Justice’s surprise.89 Nevertheless, what state
conventions might take from the state legislature they might be
required to give back to the state legislature, because the conventions
only acted in the absence of any other law. Indeed, when the state
had just been admitted to the union, promulgation of a new constitution occurred at a time when no state legislature, much less state,
existed.90
Additionally, the Arizona State Legislature majority opinion
acknowledged that direct lawmaking did exist at the founding and
early in the Republic, and that it did not “gain[] a foothold” until the
twentieth century.91 That is true, but somewhat misleading in the
context of construing the phrase “Legislature.” (Indeed, it is somewhat irrelevant to note later in the opinion that “the initiative and
the referendum—were not yet in our democracy’s arsenal,” when other forms of direct democracy were known well before the twentieth
century and bear upon the question of the direct democracy and the
power of the “Legislature.”)92
Historically, Congress also continued to turn to the independent
state legislature doctrine in ensuing legislation, and state courts
would continue to believe that the legislature could trump a state
constitution.93 Even in instances when state courts found a state law
unconstitutional, a house of Congress might still conclude that the
Elections Clause permitted the federal election to take place under
that state law.94
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Arizona State Legislature
does not accurately reflect these points, noting that in Baldwin, the
Michigan Supreme Court held “as courts generally do, that state leg-

89. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1795 (1850); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677-80 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Even this did not occur without some dissent in Congress. See id. And perhaps the greatest
and earliest critic of this view was Justice Joseph Story, who spoke out vociferously against
any efforts of the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1820 to provide for any
regulation of federal elections, as doing so would usurp the state legislature’s role under
the Elections Clause. See generally JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE
CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS
110 (Boston, Daily Advertiser rev. ed. 1853), http://www.archive.org/details/
cu31924032657326 (“Here an express provision was made for the manner of choosing representatives by the state legislatures. They have unlimited discretion in the
subject. . . . [T]hat is the proposition on the table? It is to limit this discretion . . . .”).
90. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1795 (1850).
91. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 U.S. at 2659.
92. Id. at 2672.
93. See generally Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State
Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 189 (2014).
94. HINDS, supra note 53, § 947, at 238.
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islation in direct conflict with the State’s constitution is void.”95
Courts, yes—but not necessarily Congress. Courts facing a conflict
between two provisions might conclude that the constitution trumps
the law, but a house of Congress judging an election might still conclude that the law trumps the constitution—at least, if the adjudicating of the election also includes a consideration of the scope of the
Elections Clause. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court did not even
consider an Elections Clause argument that might have otherwise
empowered the state legislature: it only compared the state law to its
state constitution.96
B. Congressional Precedent
This distinction between the roles of courts and Congress yields
two more questions about the proper role of these precedents. First,
this case represents an instance of the Supreme Court tacitly assuming jurisdiction over a dispute that is supposedly reserved to Congress. At the very least, the Court has felt comfortable extending its
role into these types of disputes that had traditionally been reserved
to Congress.97 And it is, after all, an area in which Congress has regularly engaged its judicial function and pored over the relevant provisions of the Constitution in dispute.
This critique differs from the pure standing critique that Justices
Scalia and Thomas raised in their dissents.98 They worried about the
courts “treading upon” separation of powers disputes between “state
legislatures and executives.”99 That worry, however, is distinct from
the notion that Congress, and perhaps not the judiciary, ought to
resolve the interpretation of the Elections Clause pursuant to its Article I, Section 5 power. And that might come closer to the political
question doctrine.100

95. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2674 (emphasis added).
96. See People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 136 (1865) (“And we are only
concerned, therefore, in determining whether the constitution of Michigan has prevented
the state legislature from exercising complete control over the locality of elections, and
whether, if such control is limited, the limitation is applicable to the subject before us.”).
97. The scope of a kind of political question doctrine in the area of election disputes is
left for another day, but the Court has had little difficulty injecting itself in election
disputes in situations where Congress otherwise might sit as “judge.” See generally U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15
(1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932);
Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
98. Curiously, although Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed that there was no
standing and would have dismissed the Arizona state legislature’s claim, they chose to
dissent rather than concur in the result. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2694-97
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 548; see also Muller, supra note 47, at 578.
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Second, the Court’s treatment of a few congressional adjudications, and its wholesale failure to cite many more, calls into question
how courts ought to handle these precedents. After all, Congress is
acting as judge in these election disputes; it takes evidence, holds
hearings, and issues opinions, often citing its own precedents.101
It takes on a judicial function and acts in a judicial manner. How the
Court might—and should—use those precedents remains deeply
undertheorized, although the examination of congressional precedents is nothing new.102 While the Court introduces some rather ad
hoc standards for these precedents (for instance, Chief Justice
Roberts suggesting that Baldwin is the superior precedent because
it’s later in time than Shiel), it might benefit the Court—and litigants—to explore more of these election disputes’ briefs, arguments,
and opinions.
Justice Ginsburg does offer a rather unfair characterization of
Congress’s role under Article I, Section 5 in Baldwin in an attempt to
diminish its value: “Finally, it was perhaps not entirely accidental
that the candidate the Committee declared winner in Baldwin belonged to the same political party as all but one member of the House
Committee majority responsible for the decision.”103 Evidence suggests that Congress has generally resisted raw tribal partisanship
in adjudicating election contests.104 To devalue Congress’s express
authority to adjudicate election disputes as a kind of bare partisan
squabbling is an undermining of the structural design of the Constitution in all election disputes.
C. Legislative Delegations
Finally, suppose one could surmount these justiciability problems
and examine more deeply the historical election disputes adjudicated
in Congress (or, in the context of the Seventeenth Amendment, in the
state courts and legislatures). They offer a fairly consistent string of
instances rejecting the proposition that the power of the legislature
could be delegated to another entity. These are wholly missed by
the Court.
The majority opinion in Arizona State Legislature offers no constitutional analysis, simply asserting ipse dixit that the state constitution authorizes the people to delegate legislative power to another

101. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 5, cl. 1.
102. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 509; see also U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 819.
103. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2674.
104. See, e.g., Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787,
1840-41 (2014). But see id. (acknowledging increased partisanship during and following the
Civil War).
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agency.105 Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, briefly notes this absence
of legal authority for the delegation principle.106 But even that
opinion misses a salient issue. Assuming the state legislature (or the
people) had the power under state law (or the state constitution) to
delegate its power to another, does the United States Constitution
authorize that delegation?
There is a non-delegation doctrine in administrative law,107 one
that extends to congressional power but not necessarily state legislative power.108 Within the congressional and state-based precedent
of legislative power discussed above, however, one finds a similar
non-delegation doctrine that prevents the authority from being transferred entirely from the state legislature to someone else.
The Seventeenth Amendment analogy rests, constitutionally
speaking, on the idea that no one—neither the state legislature itself
nor the people acting via initiative—could delegate the electoral power from the state legislature to the people.109 And the discussions in
cases like Stockton110 and Sessinghaus111 turn largely upon the notion
that the legislative power cannot be delegated to another entity—not
to a joint convention, not to a municipality, not to anyone else.
There is some irony, then, in the majority’s position that seeks
so strongly to separate the section 3 and section 4 powers of the state
legislature. The section 3 power of the legislature to elect emphatically could never be delegated away, a point the majority readily
accepts. But that the section 4 power—the lawmaking authority—of
the state could be simply handed off to another agency to exercise on
a permanent basis is far less obvious. Indeed, existing precedent
disfavors the delegation of lawmaking authority to another entity.
Even within the analogous congressional non-delegation doctrine,
agencies are given some authority that may otherwise ostensibly be
within the purview of Congress: when Congress provides an
“intelligible principle” to an agency, the agency may act within scope
105. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2673.
106. Id. at 2677-78.
107. See, e.g., Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress generally cannot
delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”).
108. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2689 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (reflecting
doubt that Congress could “delegate authority to one actor when the Constitution vests
that authority in another actor” (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
472 (2001))).
109. While Justice Ginsburg’s opinion explains that the power to elect senators has a
different “ ‘function,’ ” one “to the exclusion of other participants,” it does not explain why
that power could not have been delegated to another entity, unless the Constitution,
overriding contrary state law, precluded such a delegation. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135
S. Ct. at 2667-68 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365 (1932)).
110. See discussion supra Section IV.B.3.a.
111. See discussion supra Section IV.B.3.b.
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of that principle.112 And Congress always holds the final authority to
override the decision of a federal agency.113 One could perhaps ignore
the express legislative delegation to the independent commission and
instead conclude that commission acted pursuant to the “intelligible
principle” of a series of redistricting standards promulgated by the
people.114
But the Arizona legislature remained wholly cut out of the process, with no similar opportunity to override the decision of the commission. Its express purpose, after all, was to cut the legislature out
of the process.
These deep-rooted understandings of the power of the legislature
in the federal Constitution do not necessarily constrict the state legislature, of course. It might be the case that the federal Constitution,
one of enumerated powers and one that specifically vests the lawmaking authority exclusively in Congress, does not include a similar
non-delegation doctrine principle as to state legislatures. But Congress’s—and the states’—historical understanding of the legislature’s
role in both section 3 and section 4 disputes belies the notion that the
State can vest the legislature’s federal constitutional authority in an
unelected body.115
And the Elections Clause itself offers a similar structural reason
to incorporate a non-delegation principle. The Clause permits “Congress . . . at any time by Law” to “make or alter such Regulations.”116
Because Congress may not cede this authority to another body, and
because Congress always has the power to override the decisions of
any agency that might otherwise engage in its regulatory capacity, a
better reading of the state legislature’s role would subject it to similar constraints. After all, it would seem incongruous for state legislatures to have more power than Congress to allocate their authority
without some meaningful explanation for such a distinction.117
112. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 328-29
(2002).
113. See, e.g., Contract with America Advance Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012) (allowing
for expedited congressional review of federal regulations).
114. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14) (describing scope of authority and factors
the independent commission should consider in drawing congressional districts).
115. Despite the best efforts of the people of Arizona to divest the state legislature of
any power in the area of redistricting, the very point of tasking the legislature with the
primary lawmaking responsibility is precisely because it is the branch accountable to the
people. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
117. Admittedly, an immediate flaw with this reading of the Elections Clause arises
when considering the state “legislature” itself. The legislature need not be composed in the
same fashion as the United States Congress. But, it would undermine the notion that the
“legislature” is wholly without an independent constitutional meaning and turns
exclusively on how the states—including decisions of the people or within the state
constitution—choose to define the “legislature.”
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This delegation point is certainly a narrow issue in the case, and
these inquiries only scratch the surface of a much deeper investigation into the scope of any non-delegation principles that may extend
to state legislatures under the United States Constitution. In this
case, the broader affirmation of the people to enact laws via ballot
initiative will likely have broader consequences, such as potentially
authorizing the people to amend the manner of choosing electors,118
or consenting to divide a state into parts.119 Apparently, there is deeply engrained in the constitutional structure a prohibition on delegation of the electoral power, but not of the lawmaking power—when,
in reality, the non-delegation doctrine in Article I cases places its
emphasis on the lawmaking power.120
But it is, perhaps, in some of these smaller points—the tacit acceptance of judicial authority to decide what Congress usually decides; the ad hoc, selective examination of Congress’s judicial precedents; the largely uncritical resolution of a permanent delegation of
authority from the legislature to another entity—that the case will
have a lasting impact on the roles of the judiciary and the legislature.

118. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 2 (1892); Richard L. Hasen, When
“Legislature” May Mean More Than “Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and
the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 599 (2008); Derek T. Muller, The
Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372,
372-73 (2007).
119. Letter from Timothy Cook Draper, to Initiative Coordinator, Office of the
Att’y Gen. (Dec. 19, 2013), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/13-0063%20(130063%20(Six%20Californias)).pdf (proposing a statewide ballot measure under California’s
constitution).
120. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 112, at 351-53.
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